Abstract. We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of optimal strategies for both the players.
Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley in [9] . Following this pioneering work there has been a lot of work on stochastic games. For a survey on zero-sum games we refer to [10] .
Most of the available literature in this category concerns stochastic games with complete observation, i.e., at each stage, the state of the game is completely known to the players. Although there is considerable amount of literature (see [2] , [3] , [4] and the references therein) available on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) of which stochastic games are a generalisation, the corresponding literature in partially observable stochastic games is rather sparse. In [5] the authors study zero-sum games for partially observable stochastic games under discounted payoff criterion. In this article we investigate the same problem with the average payoff criterion. In [3] the authors study POMDP under the average cost criteria using the approach based on Athreya-Ney-Nummelin construction of pseudo-atoms ( [1] , [8] ) as described in [7] . In this article we extend those ideas to the zero-sum game case. Zero-sum stochastic games are generally studied by solving the corresponding dynamic programming or Shapely equations [10] . This approach has also been carried out for partially observable games in [5] . In this paper instead of solving the appropriate Shapely equations we solve two dynamic programming type inequalities, which in turn lead to the existence of a value and saddle point strategies. Also our article extends the idea of using the pseudo-atom approach in solving MDP, to the stochastic game setup.
Under certain Lyapunov assumption we use the pseudo-atom construction to carry out a coupling argument, which gives us appropriate bound on the relative α−discounted value function. This bound then enables us to make appropriate limiting arguments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we use the vanishing discount approach to prove the existence of a value and a saddle-point equilibrium for the POSG. We conclude with a few remarks in Section 4.
Preliminaries and Model Description
Let X, Y and U, V be Polish spaces representing state, observation and action spaces for player 1 and player 2 respectively. We further assume that U and V are compact. For any Polish space S, we denote by P(S) the Polish space of probability measures on S and by B(S) the Borel σ-field on S. Let {X n } be an X-valued partially observed controlled Markov chain with Y -valued observation process {Y n }. Let
be a transition kernel which is assumed to be continuous in its arguments. Let λ denote a regular Borel radon measure on X. We assume the existence of a probability measure η on
The chain is controlled by two players. The first player chooses his actions from U and player 2 chooses his actions from V . Let {U n } be an U -valued control sequence of player 1 and {V n } be a V -valued control sequence of player 2. The transition probability function of the controlled chain {X n } together with the observation chain {Y n } is given by
for A ∈ B(X) and B ∈ B(Y ). The partially observed stochastic game (POSG) under ergodic payoff criteria is the following:
(i) The initial distribution of the (unobservable) state process is ψ which is known to both the players; Y 0 is deterministic, say Y 0 = y * for some fixed element y * in Y .
(ii) At the 0th epoch the players based on the knowledge that the initial distribution of the state process is ψ, independently choose actions u 0 ∈ U and v 0 ∈ V . Consequently, (iv) Each player can recall at any time the observations and actions of the past.
We now construct a probability space on which all the random variables are defined. the canonical sample space is defined as
A generic element is of the form
The history spaces are defined as
The state, observation, actions and history processes denoted by {X n }, {Y n }, {U n }, {V n }, {H n } respectively are defined by the projections
The entire history up to time n is not available to the players for decision making at time n. The players have to make their decisions based on the observed history or information
and the initial distribution ψ. We define the information spaces as follows:
The information process is defined by
An admissible strategy for player 1 is a sequence π 1 = {π 1 n } of stochastic kernels on U given P(X) × I n . The set of admissible strategies for player 1 is denoted by Π 1 . Similarly an admissible strategy for player 2 is a sequence π 2 = {π 2 n } of stochastic kernels on V given P(X) × I n . The set of admissible strategies for player 2 is denoted by Π 2 . With ψ in P(X) and a pair of admissible strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 specified, there exists a unique probability measure P
We now describe the payoff criterion. Given the initial distribution ψ and a pair of strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 , the average payoff criterion is given by
where E
is the expectation with respect to the probability measure P
. Player 1 wishes to maximise V π 1 ,π 2 (ψ) over all his admissible strategies and player 2 wishes to minimise the same over all his admissible strategies. A strategy π * 1 is said to be optimal for player 1 if
for any π 2 ∈ Π 2 . Similarly a strategy π * 2 is said to be optimal for player 2 if
for any π 1 ∈ Π 1 . The game is said to have a value if
If a pair of optimal strategies (π * 1 , π * 2 ) exists for both the players then the pair (π * 1 , π * 2 )
is called a saddle point equilibrium. Now since the original state process is unobservable we define another state variable which is observable to the players. In order to achieve that, we have by conditioning
where {Ψ n } is the regular conditional law of X n given I n , satisfying the recursion
Equation (2.4) is known as the filtering equation. Note that since Y 0 is deterministic, Ψ 0 = the law of X 0 . This allows us to consider an equivalent stochastic game with P(X)-valued state process {Ψ n } with its evolution given by (2.4), under the same set of admissible strategies and with the payoff criterion given by (2.3). This is a completely observable stochastic game (COSG) because Ψ n is known to both the players via the information upto time n. Thus we can solve the original POSG by solving this equivalent COSG. Now in order to show that the POSG model under the average payoff criterion has a saddle point equilibrium and a value we impose the following Lyapunov type assumptions on our model.
(A1) There exists inf-compact functions h and V ∈ C(X) satisfying h ≥ 1, such that under any pair of admissible strategies and for any initial distribution
where K is some compact set with λ(K) > 0 and
We have dropped the super-and subscripts on E for notational convenience. Let
Then it is well known that ( [7] )
Define P 0 (X) = {µ ∈ P(X) : Vdµ < ∞} . Now using (2.5) we obtain
Hence it follows that if Ψ 0 ∈ P 0 (X) then Ψ n ∈ P 0 (X), ∀n ≥ 1. We assume that Ψ 0 ∈ P 0 (X) and hence {Ψ n } can be viewed as a P 0 (X)-valued process. We further assume that (A2) Under all admissible strategies and for any initial distribution
Saddle Point Strategies and Value
We follow the vanishing discount approach to solve the average cost problem. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Then consider the following discounted payoff POSG:
Player 1 tries to maximise the above quantity over all his admissible strategies and player 2 tries to minimise the same quantity over his admissible strategies. The definitions for the value of the game and for the optimal strategies can be given analogous to that of average payoff criterion. The following theorem can be proved using the equivalence with the COSG as discussed above and standard arguments as in [5] :
Theorem 3.1. The discounted payoff POSG has a value and the value function V α (.) is the unique bounded solution of the following pair of Shapley equations:
where
withφ(dψ ′ |ψ, u, v) being the controlled transition kernel of the Markov chain {Ψ n }, and
Moreover let u * : P 0 (X) → P(U ) be a measurable function such that u * (.) is an outer maximiser of (3.1) then the strategy {π * n 1 } given by
is optimal for player 1. Further let v * : P 0 (X) → P(V ) be a measurable function such that v * (.) is an outer minimiser of (3.1) then {π * n 2 } given by
is an optimal strategy for player 2.
Now for the vanishing discount approach we need to compare V α (.) for two different values of its argument. For that we construct on a common probability space two X-valued controlled Markov chains as above, controlled by the same pair of strategies but with different initial distributionsψ andψ. This is done by a modification of the construction in the previous section. Let {π 1 n } be an admissible strategy for player 1 and let {π 2 n } be an admissible strategy for player 2. Definē
withF being the corresponding product Borel σ-algebra. DefineP
, a probability measure on (Ω,F ) bȳ
On (Ω,F ,P), define the processes {X n }, {X n }, {Ŷ n }, {Ỹ n }, {U n }, {V n } canonically. Then the Markov chains {X n }, {X n } on (Ω,F,P) form the desired pair. For notational simplicity we omit the superscripts and subscripts onP. We denote byX n = (X n ,X n ) and the associated observation pair byȲ n = (Ŷ n ,Ỹ n ). Then {X n } is an X 2 valued Markov chain.
Let the controlled transition kernel be denoted bȳ
for any Borel set A of X 2 . Then if follows from our assumptions that
. This is the minorization condition of [7] in the present context which enables us to carry out the Athreya-Ney-Nummelin construction of pseudo-atom [7] . Let H = X 2 and H * = X 2 × {0, 1}. Endow H * with its Borel σ−field. For any measure µ on H, define a measure µ * on H * as follows: For Borel A ⊂ H, let A 0 = A × {0} and
On a suitable probability space (Ω * , F * , P * ), define an H * -valued controlled Markov chain {X * n , i * n } (where X * n = (X * n ,X * n )) with U -valued control process {U * n } and V -valued control process {V * n } and Y 2 -valued observation process {Y * n }, such that:
and
From the above construction the following lemmas can be proved.
Lemma 3.2. The set K 2 × {1} is an accessible atom of {(X * n , i * n )} in the sense of Meyn and Tweedie ( [7] ).
Lemma 3.3. For any Borel
Then the following lemma can be proved using (A1) and standard arguments as in [7] Lemma 3.4. Under (A1) we have,
, where τ is as in (3.2).
The following lemma gives a bound on the difference of V α (.) for two different values of its argument.
Lemma 3.5. Forψ,ψ ∈ P 0 (X), there exists a suitable constantK such that
The other case can be handled with a symmetric argument. Let π 1 = {π 1 n } be an optimal policy for player 1 for the discounted payoff POSG with initial distributionψ and let π 2 = {π 2 n } be an optimal policy for player 2 for the discounted payoff POSG with initial distributionψ. Then we have
where the third step follows from the fact thatX * τ +m ,X * τ +m for m ≥ 1 has the same law conditioned on all the information up to time τ . Thus from (3.3) we have
Hence the lemma follows. Now fix ψ * ∈ P 0 (X). DefineV α (ψ) = V α (ψ) − V α (ψ * ). Thus substituting in (3.1) we get
is bounded. Thus we can find an α(n) → 1 such that
for some γ ∈ R. LetV (ψ) = lim sup n→∞V α(n) (ψ) and V (ψ) = lim inf n→∞V α(n) (ψ).
Lemma 3.6. The functionV satisfieŝ
where γ is as in (3.5).
Proof. We havē
Now taking limit n → ∞ in the above we get
In the second step µ * n is the outer maximiser. Now fix π. By dropping to a subsequence if necessary, we may suppose thatV α(n) (ψ) →V (ψ) and µ * n → µ * in P(U ). Now by previous lemma |V α (ψ)| ≤ K 1 (1+ Vdψ). Thus by Lemma 8.3.7 in [6] , the last expression is bounded above by
The claim follows.
Similarly we have the following result.
Lemma 3.7. The function V satisfies
In the second step ν * n is the outer minimiser. Now by arguments analogous to the proof of the above lemma we have that there exists a ν * ∈ P(V ) such that the last expression is V (ψ ′ )φ(dψ ′ |ψ, µ, ν) .
Finally we get the following theorem:
Theorem 3.8. Assume (A1-A2). Then γ (as in ( 3.5)) is the value of the COSG. Moreover let u * : P 0 (X) → P(U ) be a measurable function such that u * (.) is the outer maximiser of the righthand side of (3.6) (exists by our assumptions and a standard measurable selection theorem). Then the strategy {π * n Then by taking limit n → ∞ we have using assumption (A2)
γ ≥ lim inf Theorem 3.9. The POSG with average cost criterion has a value and is equal to γ (as in (3.5)) for any initial distribution. Moreover, ({π * n 1 }, {π * n 2 }) given by Theorem 3.8 is a saddle point equilibrium.
Conclusion
In this article we study a partially observed stochastic game under average payoff criterion. We estimate the unobservable state variable and use the state estimate as our new observable state variable . We then use the vanishing discount approach to solve the average cost problem. Our analysis involves a coupling argument which uses the machinery of pseudo-atom construction. We show that the game has a value and also prove the existence of a saddle point equilibrium for our partially observable model.
